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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2408 
_____________ 
 
CHAZON QTA QUANTITATIVE TRADING ARTISTS, L.L.C.,  
and LAWRENCE I. FEJOKWU, 
                                   Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC Docket No. CRAA 16-01) 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 29, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 13, 2018) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Lawrence Fejokwu and his company Chazon QTA Quantitative Trading Artists, 
L.L.C. (“Chazon”) were permanently barred from membership in the National Futures 
                                              
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Association (NFA) for failing to cooperate promptly and fully with an NFA investigation.  
They appealed to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which upheld 
the NFA’s finding and sanction.  Now they petition this Court to review that decision 
under 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(4).  We will deny the petition.  
I. 
Because we write only for the parties, we recite just those facts necessary to our 
decision.  
Fejokwu is the founder of two foundations, the Vision Foundations, that focus on 
pan-African socioeconomic development.  In April 2011, Chazoneering, S.A., an entity 
solely owned and operated by Fejokwu, transferred $1.6 million to the Vision 
Foundations.  The Vision Foundations used that money to fund the Maria Funds, a pair of 
commodity pools operated by Chazon.  Fejokwu registered Chazon with the NFA as a 
commodities pool operator, with himself as its principal. 
From the beginning, the Maria Funds suffered significant losses.  The funds had 
only $125,000 remaining by March 2014. 
At that point, Fejokwu applied to withdraw Chazon from the NFA to save costs.  
Fejokwu argued that he and Chazon were exempt from NFA registration under the so-
called small-pool exemption, 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(2).  That exemption provides that a 
commodities pool operator need not register with the NFA if none of its pools has more 
than 15 participants and the total gross capitalization of all of its pools does not exceed 
$400,000, excluding the operator’s and principal’s own money. 
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Fejokwu’s withdrawal request triggered an NFA investigation.  Fejokwu at first 
cooperated with the investigation, providing on request the Vision Foundations’ 
organizational documents, balance sheets, and ledgers, the Maria Funds’ 2013 bank 
statements, and Chazon’s bank and broker statements.  On further request, Fejokwu also 
provided the Maria Funds’ and the Vision Foundations’ bank statements from 2011. 
The NFA then asked for Chazoneering’s bank statements.  Fejokwu balked at this 
request.  He felt that he had already provided sufficient evidence that the small-pool 
exemption applied and that the NFA was not entitled to Chazoneering’s documents since 
that entity was not an NFA member and did not trade futures.  He ultimately provided the 
LLC agreement and 2013 and 2014 bank statements for Chazoneering, LLC — a 
different entity than the one that indirectly capitalized the Maria Funds.1  But he refused 
to provide any Chazoneering bank statements from 2011, when the Vision Foundations 
were funded.  He then added the Vision Foundations as listed principals of Chazon, 
which arguably made review of Chazoneering’s bank statements unnecessary — because 
listing the Visions Foundations as Chazon principals made clear that all the Maria Funds’ 
money came from Chazon principals.  When the NFA still insisted, Fejokwu asked to 
discuss the request with NFA lawyers or supervisors.  Rather than give him that 
opportunity, the NFA concluded its investigation with a finding that Fejokwu had failed 
to cooperate. 
                                              
1 In this opinion, we differentiate between the Chazoneering entities only when the 
distinction is relevant. 
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The NFA then filed a formal complaint charging Fejokwu and Chazon with 
violating NFA Compliance Rule 2-5.  That rule requires each NFA member and associate 
to cooperate promptly and fully with the NFA in any NFA investigation, inquiry, audit, 
examination, or proceeding regarding compliance with NFA requirements or any NFA 
disciplinary or arbitration proceeding.  Fejokwu and Chazon filed an answer, and the 
NFA held a hearing, at which Fejokwu and an NFA examiner testified. 
The NFA hearing panel issued a decision finding that Fejokwu and Chazon had 
willfully violated Rule 2-5.  The panel determined that the NFA legitimately requested 
Chazoneering’s bank statements from the time it funded the Vision Foundations because 
the NFA questioned the ultimate source of Chazon’s capital contributions and thus its 
eligibility for the small-pool exemption, among other reasons.  The panel found that 
Fejokwu was “very vague” about where Chazoneering got the money and that he 
“actually appeared to be trying to deceive NFA” about the different Chazoneering 
entities, which raised issues about his credibility.  Appendix (“App.”) 39.  “Moreover,” 
the panel explained, “the sudden listing of the Vision Foundations . . . appeared to have 
been an attempt by Fejokwu to find a reason not to provide the Chazoneering 
statements,” which “gave NFA legitimate concerns as to the funding of Chazoneering.”  
App. 40.  Since the NFA’s request for the Chazoneering bank statements was legitimate, 
the panel found that Fejokwu and Chazon willfully violated Rule 2-5 by refusing to 
provide them.  As a sanction, the panel permanently barred Fejokwu and Chazon from 
NFA membership.  
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Fejokwu and Chazon appealed to the NFA Appeals Committee, which upheld the 
panel’s conclusion and declined to modify its sanction.  On the sanction, the appeals 
committee emphasized the importance of member cooperation to the NFA’s 
effectiveness.  It also rejected Fejokwu’s argument that the violations were not willful, 
finding them to be “a conscious decision” and pointing out that Fejokwu “knowingly 
misled” the examination team about the different Chazoneering entities.  App. 21–22.  
While there was no evidence that Fejokwu harmed customers or committed fraud, the 
committee explained, “that may simply be because the documents [Fejokwu and Chazon] 
refused to produce contained or led to such evidence.”  App. 22.  Given this “very grave 
violation” and the “significance of” Rule 2-5, the appeals committee found the sanction 
“completely appropriate.”  App. 22. 
Fejokwu and Chazon appealed this decision to the CFTC, which summarily 
affirmed.  They then timely petitioned for review. 
II. 
The NFA and CFTC had jurisdiction over the underlying disciplinary proceeding 
under 7 U.S.C. § 21(b), (h).  We have appellate jurisdiction to review the CFTC’s order 
upholding the NFA’s decision under 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(4).  We are satisfied that 
jurisdiction is proper in this Court rather than in the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit despite Chazon’s New York post-office box since the record suggests that 
Fejokwu carried out Chazon’s business out of his home office in Guttenberg, New Jersey.  
See 7 U.S.C. §§  9(11)(B)(ii)(I), 21(i)(4).  We are also satisfied — and the CFTC does 
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not contest — that we have jurisdiction over the now-represented corporate appellant 
Chazon. 
We review the factual determinations of an administrative agency “to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support [its] decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review the agency’s decision to uphold sanctions for 
abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 
185–86 (1973). 
III. 
 Fejokwu and Chazon argue that substantial evidence does not show that they 
willfully violated Rule 2-5 and that a permanent bar was unwarranted and unjustified.  
We disagree.  
A.  
 There is no dispute that Fejokwu and Chazon could have provided Chazoneering’s 
2011 bank statements but refused.  Fejokwu instead argues that his refusal to cooperate 
did not violate Rule 2-5 because the NFA had no legitimate regulatory reason for 
requesting those statements.  The NFA found that there was a legitimate regulatory need 
to confirm Chazon’s eligibility for the small-pool exemption.  We conclude that 
substantial evidence supported that finding.   
Fejokwu relied on the small-pool exemption to withdraw from the NFA, giving it 
a legitimate reason to investigate Chazon’s eligibility for this exemption.  Since the 
exemption requires aggregate nonproprietary capital contributions to be under $400,000, 
the NFA had legitimate grounds to confirm that Chazoneering’s $1.6 million investment 
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was in fact proprietary — that is, legitimate business income of Chazoneering (and thus 
of Fejokwu) and not merely customer contributions funneled through Chazoneering to 
invest in the Maria Funds without proper registration.  Inquiring where Chazoneering got 
the $1.6 million was fair game.  And Fejokwu gave the NFA reason to be suspicious of 
its source.  He was cagey about the different Chazoneering entities, vague on 
Chazoneering’s actual business, and protective of only the bank statements that showed 
where Chazoneering got these funds.  The NFA thus legitimately insisted on reviewing 
Chazoneering’s 2011 bank statements to confirm Chazon’s eligibility for the small-pool 
exemption.2  Fejokwu’s refusal may not have been in bad faith, but no doubt it was 
voluntary and intentional — which makes it “willful” in the civil context.  See, e.g., 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 & n.9 (2007); Vineland Fireworks Co. v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 544 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he legal definition of ‘willful’ . . . is ‘[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily 
malicious.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1630 (8th ed. 2004)) (alteration in 
original)).  Thus, substantial evidence shows that Fejokwu and Chazon willfully violated 
Rule 2-5.  
                                              
2 The NFA hearing panel also concluded that the NFA had legitimately asked for 
Chazoneering’s 2011 bank statements to determine whether Chazon had any unlisted 
principals.  Fejokwu argues that Chazoneering’s bank statements would not show 
anyone’s direct contributions to Chazon or direct or indirect ownership interests in 
Chazon, and so could not show unlisted principals.  Since we conclude that confirming 
eligibility for the small-pool exemption was a legitimate regulatory reason to review the 
2011 statements, we do not reach this alternative justification.  
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B. 
 Fejokwu also argues that the CFTC abused its discretion by upholding the NFA’s 
permanent membership ban.   We will overturn an agency’s decision to uphold sanctions 
as an abuse of discretion only if the sanctions are “unwarranted in law or . . . without 
justification in fact.”  Butz, 411 U.S. at 185–86 (alteration in original).  “Typically, such 
an abuse of discretion will involve either a sanction palpably disproportionate to the 
violation or a failure to support the sanction chosen with a meaningful statement of 
‘findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of 
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.’”  Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A)). 
Fejokwu first argues that a permanent ban was palpably disproportionate to the 
violation.  In comparison to other cases, he argues, his would be “the only instance where 
the NFA has permanently banned a first-time offender for violating Rule 2-5 without any 
additional aggravating” circumstances.  Fejokwu Br. 46.  But, on the contrary, there were 
aggravating circumstances here.  Fejokwu was not merely intransigent; the NFA found 
him deceptive, misleading, and intentionally vague.  No doubt the sanction is severe, but 
given these circumstances we cannot say that it is unwarranted in law or without 
justification in fact.  Thus the CFTC did not abuse its discretion by upholding it.  
Fejokwu next argues that the CFTC’s summary decision fails to provide a 
meaningful statement of the reason for the sanction.  We disagree.  Both the NFA panel 
and appeals committee discussed the reasons for the sanction at some length.  These 
decisions emphasized the importance of Rule 2-5, but also Fejokwu’s misleading conduct 
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in the investigation and hearing.  The CFTC expressly adopted these findings and 
conclusions, and it also held that “the choice of sanction is neither excessive nor 
oppressive in light of the violation and the public interest.”  App. 7.  No doubt Fejokwu 
wishes that the NFA had credited other, mitigating factors, but he still received a 
meaningful statement of the findings, conclusions, and reasons underpinning the chosen 
sanction.  We cannot conclude that the CFTC abused its discretion by adopting the 
NFA’s reasons and upholding its sanction. 
IV. 
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
